Why do people voluntarily follow and obey their rulers? Why do people accept and maintain authorities and institutions? In authoritarian regimes people obey involuntarily, by fear. But, as Xenophon already knew, the power of tyrants is not based uniquely on material force and constraints.
Even the most tyrannic rulers try to justify their reign. The key concept to the understanding of this effort of justification is legitimacy, because only legitimacy can transform brutal power into recognized authority. Legitimacy has always been in the mind of political thinkers. Plato’s idea of justice bears on the problem of legitimacy, as well as Aristotle’s distinction between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. In his analysis of the nature of government, Locke displaced the source of legitimacy, replacing the divine right of kings by the consent of the people.
No discussion of the concept of power could be complete without reference to legitimacy. For contemporary political systems in which participation of the people is a criterion of political worth, legitimacy is a fundamental concept.DEFINITIONS OF LEGITIMACY
The concept of legitimacy and its definition have changed significantly since the emergence of democratic governments. As Schaar points out, current definitions of legitimacy dissolve legitimacy into belief or opinion (Schaar 1981). If people hold the belief that existing institutions are appropriate or morally proper, then those institutions are legitimate.
Such a reference to beliefs becomes even clearer when we consider the widely accepted definition formulated by Lipset: ‘the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society’ (Lipset 1959:77).
It is also clear in Merkl’s definition: ‘a nation united by a consensus on political values…a solemnly and widely accepted legal and constitutional order of democratic character…and an elective government responsive to the expressed needs of the people’ (Merkl 1988:21).
Juan Linz proposes as a ‘minimalist’ definition ‘the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than any other that might be established, and therefore can demand obedience’ (Linz 1988:65).
The concept of ‘diffuse regime support’ developed by David Easton is another way to define legitimacy (Easton 1965).
The best-known definition of legitimacy today was formulated by Max Weber, who distinguished three types of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational (Weber 1978).
This typology has been meaningfully applied in many historical studies: ‘Since Weber, we have been busy putting the phenomenon into one or another of his three boxes and charting the progress by which charismatic authority becomes routinized into traditional authority, which…gives way in turn to rational legal authority’ (Schaar 1981:15).Legitimacy is particularly important in democracies since a democracy’s survival is ultimately dependent on the support of at least a majority of its citizens; it holds that at least a majority must deem it legitimate.
Hence, without the granting of legitimacy by the people, a democracy would lose its authority. On the other hand, legitimacy in this sense of public belief and support is considerably less important in non-democratic regimes. In dictatorships, while the granting of support or legitimacy by the people may be an asset, it is not of
ultimate importance since authority is based on force.
Authoritarian regimes may lack legitimacy but they still feel a need to acquire it. The subtitle of Michael Hudson’s book on Arab politics is very significant: The Search for Legitimacy (Hudson 1977).
He clearly explains this need: The central problem of government in the Arab World today is political legitimacy. The shortage of this indispensable political resource largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic, unstable character of all the present Arab governments… Whether in power or in the opposition, Arab politicians must operate in a political environment in which the legitimacy of rulers, regimes and the institutions is sporadic and, at best, scarce.
Under these conditions seemingly irrational behavior, such as assassinations, coups d’etat and official repression, may in fact derive from…the low legitimacy accorded to political processes and institutions. (Hudson 1977:2)